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A Frame of Reference for the Study of 
American Foreign Policy-Making 
ROBERT E. CECILE 
Wright State Campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities 
ABSTRACT - This study outlines a frame of reference which might be helpful to political scientists 
in the onolysis of foreign policy decision-making. It is part of a larger effort which seeks to learn 
more about state action in general and Americon foreign policy decision-making in particular. 
The approach which is utilized is one devised by Richard C. Snyder. It has been modified by 
the author lo suit the purposes and objectives of the present study. Basically, the approach is a 
conceptual scheme which postulates that state action results from the way identifiable, official 
decision-makers define the situation of action in order to arrive at a decision. The scheme fo-
cuses inquiry on these decision-makers in an attempt to determine why a particular decision was 
made rather than some other. Basic to the theory is the premise that decision-making behavior 
takes place in a complex organizational' setting which can be accounted for by the interrelation 
of three clusters of variables: sphere of competence, motivation, and information-communications. 
The basic assumption is that all factors which influence the results of a decision can be accounted 
for by these variables. Ultimately, the theory holds that, if a sufficient number of factual proposi-
tions on the behaviors and activities implied by these variables can be established, the interrela-
tionship of these three sets of propositions becomes the empirical foundation for the explanation 
of a decision. 
The present study, utilizing this scheme, focuses on three contemporary U.S. Presidents -
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson - in an effort to draw conclusions from their foreign policy 
decision-making methods. A number of preliminary findings are presented to illustrate the type 
of information which can be derived from an application of the decision-making approach. 
This paper is a report on research in progress which 
seeks to apply an analytical scheme to the study of de-
cision-making at the state level. Taken in its broadest 
perspective, the study represents an effort to demonstrate 
the feasibility of using the decision-making approach to 
collect, analyze, and relate data relative to the actions of 
decision-makers. More specifically, the study is an at-
tempt to compare the decision-making activities of three 
contemporary United States Presidents-Dwight D . Eis-
enhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson-
in order to provide grounds upon which to generalize re-
garding American foreign policy-making. 
It is hoped that the brief description of the conceptual 
scheme and the preliminary data presented here will be 
helpful to others interested in foreign policy research 
and analysis. 
Approach 
The approach applied here is a modified version of 
one devised by Richard C. Snyder at Northwestern Uni-
versity in the l 950's (Snyder, 1962). Commonly called 
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the "decision-making" approach, the scheme is basically 
an ordering device, or a frame of reference, which con-
ceives of state action as resulting from the way identifi-
able decision-makers define the situation of action in or-
der to arrive at a decision. The scheme focuses inquiry 
on these decision-makers in an attempt to determine why 
a particular decision is made rather than some other . It 
postulates that decision-making takes places in a complex 
organizational setting and can be accounted for by the 
interrelation of three clusters of variables: spheres of 
competence, communications and information, and moti-
vation. The basic assumption is that all factors which in-
fluence a decision can be accounted for by these varia-
bles. 
Two different perspectives are included in the scheme: 
the properties of the decision-makers-defined as the in-
tellectual setting-and the properties of the system within 
which they operate-defined as the organizational setting. 
Ultimately, the theory holds that, if a sufficient number 
of factual propositions on the behaviors and activities im-
plied by these variables can be established, the interrela-
tionship of these three sets of propositions becomes the 
empirical foundation for the explanation of a decision. 
Spheres of Competence 
Under the heading of competence is included the "of-
fice" or "role" of the decision-maker. The term compe-
tence is used an inclusive device to take in the totality of 
the activities of the decision-maker relevant and neces-
sary to the achievement of the organizational objective. 
The decision-maker's conception of his role or office, 
both in terms of explicitly prescribed rules and conven-
tional norms, as well as the manner in which he struc-
tures his relationships with his subordinates is classified 
131 
under this heading. Inasmuch as we are dealing with the 
interaction of the decision-maker and his competence, a 
consideration of his value system, his prior experience, 
and his learned behavior are also considered highly rele-
vant and are included in the overall consideration of 
competence. 
Information and Communications 
Classified under information and communications are 
data which refer to the system or network of communica-
tions by which information is channeled to the decision-
maker, as well as to the information which is actually 
available to him when he makes his decision. Considered 
in these terms, the entire organizational and decisional 
system may be viewed as a communications "net" which 
serves three basic functions. First, it supports or confirms 
the structure of authority. Second, it makes possible the 
circulation of orders and directives. Finally, it enables 
the decision-maker to define the situation in terms of 
relevant information. The entire system, then, has a di-
rect bearing on the decision-maker's authority relation-
ships and his perception of situations requiring action . 
A study of information and communications is under-
taken in an effort to answer such questions as: what is 
the source of specific information? how is it brought to 
the attention of the decision-maker? is information fil-
tered through a number of subordinates before it reaches 
the decision-maker? where does information enter the 
system? how is it considered by the decision-maker? 
Motivation 
Due to the many difficulties involved in the determina-
tion of individual motives, most conceptual schemes 
which endeavor to probe the minds of decision-makers 
tend to assume motivation and do not treat it as a spe-
cific entity. Snyder, however, despite the difficulties in-
volved, includes an analysis of motivation as an integral 
part of his scheme, noting that, "to assume motivation 
begs many of the most significant questions which arise 
in the study of international politics" (Snyder, 1962: 
137). 
Implicit in the study of motivation is the assumption 
that the actions of a decision-maker cannot be explained 
in terms of a single motive. Thus, multiple motives are 
assumed and these are treated as constituting a system in 
which they relate to one another and are expressed in 
related actions. 
Also, it is important to note that motives are not be-
haviors, but rather they are inferences drawn from be-
haviors. Thus, they are indirectly inferred, not directly 
observed. As Snyder suggests, "motives are postulated as 
a basis of understanding and are verified by observing 
behavior" (Snyder, 1962: 139). 
The study of the decision-maker's motivation centers 
around this concept in an effort to determine, from his 
behavior, what inner drives, needs, and goals motivated 
him to take action. Necessarily included is a study of the 
decision-maker's personality, attitudes, perceptions, 
norms, values, role expectations, and intellectual skills. 
The search is for the answer to "why" questions: why 
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did the decision-maker act as he did? why did he per-
ceive of the situation as one requiring action? why did 
the action take the particular form that it did in a partic-
ular situation? In short, what inner tendencies of the de-
cision-maker prompted him to take action and how did 
these affect the type of action which was taken? 
Connection Between the Variables 
It has been noted that the variables which constitute 
the determinants of decision-making are interrelated. 
One of the tasks confronting the researcher, then, after 
isolating the major determinants, consists of logically 
connecting the variables and showing how their summa-
tion led to the decision which was made. Such a linkage 
is suggested by the paradigm in Figure 1. The model is 
intended to serve as a general outline of the theory to 
more explicitly conceptualize the interrelationship of the 
variables. 
The paradigm suggests that knowledge and informa-
tion must be communicated to the decision-maker who 
then perceives of the situation in terms of this informa-
tion + competence + motives. The aggregation of the 
three sets of variables takes place in the organizational 
and intellectual setting of the decision-maker and a de-
sired course of action then results from this summation. 
Thus, there is an "input" and an "output" function. And 
the decision which is eventually made - output - can be 
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explained in terms of the summation and interrelation of 
the three variables representing input. 
Scope and Methology 
The larger study, which constitutes the basis for this 
report, focuses on three specific decisions of Presidents 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson: Eisenhower's de-
cision relative to the Suez crisis of 1956, Kennedy's de-
cision in the Cuban crises of 1962, and Johnson's deci-
sion to resume the bombing of North Viet Nam in Feb-
ruary 1966. No attempt will be made, however, to ac-
count for these decisions; that will be left for the more 
comprehensive report. Instead, a sample of some of the 
findings derived from the study to date will be presented 
to illustrate the type of information which can be ob-
tained from such an analysis . 
As to methodology and sources, it might be mentioned 
that newspaper and magazine articles written at the time 
of each decision are especially valuable in reconstructing 
the decisional events. By pooling information from news-
paper and magazine sources with whatever documents 
and official accounts are available, a reasonably accurate 
reconstruction can be made. 
Personal interviews with the decision-makers and their 
staff are, of course, a prime source of information and, 
when such interviews are not feasible, questionnaires can 
be sent to these individuals in an effort to elicit infor-
mation. In addition, where neither personal interviews 
nor questionnaires prove fruitful, journalists who have 
talked with the decision-makers can be contacted. In 
the present study the author found this to be an extreme-
ly valuable approach. 
Finally, the more traditional sources consisting of 
public documents, speeches, memoirs, etc., are an impor-
tant source of data which can be integrated with the 
other material. 
Specific Characteristics of Eisenhower, Kennedy 
and Johnson 
A study of the three major variables - spheres of com-
petence, motivation, and information-communications -
as they relate to Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson has 
resulted in the isolation of some fifty specific characteris-
tics of these Presidents which are highly relevant to their 
foreign policy-making activities. A sample of these, along 
with the hypotheses drawn from each, is presented below 
to illustrate the type of information which emerges from 
such an analysis: 
Eisenhower-Sphere of Competence 
Characteristic: Eisenhower placed a great deal 
of reliance on his Cabinet, espe-
cially his Secretary of State. 
Specific Hypothesis: The reliance that Eisenhower 
placed upon his Cabinet led these 
individuals to formulate and exe-
cute policy on their own. In the 
case of the Secretary of State, 
this meant that much of the for-
eign policy of the U.S. was ac-
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Eisenhower-Motivation 
tually developed and put into ef-
fect without the specific approval 
of the President. 
Characteristic: Eisenhower was motivated by a 
genuine desire for peace with jus-
tice. 
Specific Hypothesis: His desire for peace with justice 
many times ruled out courses of 
action that could not readily be 
identified as peaceful and led to 
a rather narrow outlook towards 
the world political situation. 
Eisenhower-Information and Communications 
Characteristic: Eisenhower depended almost ex-
clusively on his staff to furnish 
him with information. 
Specific Hypothesis: His dependence on his staff to 
furnish him with information re-
sulted in his being supplied with 
information which they thought 
was important; thus placing a 
great deal of emphasis on his 
staff's interpretation of relevancy. 
This, in turn, many times resulted 
in Eisenhower's being unaware 
of information which he should 
have had available to make a de-
cision. 
Kennedy-Sphere of Competence 
Characteristic: Kennedy maintained a fluid and 
flexible staffing system. 
Specific Hypothesis: His maintenance of a flexible 
staffing system in which fixed 
routines and assignments were 
lacking, stimulated the "produc-
tive tension" which he believed 
resulted in a more independent 
perspective on the part of his ad-
visors. The overlapping of assign-
ments and roles inherent in this 
system served to broaden the 
range of alternatives in problem-
solving and kept uniformity of 




Kennedy desired to be a strong, 
independent President who would 
enhance the power and prestige 
of the Presidential office. 
His desires in this regard meant 
that he, and only he, would make 
important decisions and that such 
decisions would be positive-ac-
t ion decisions designed to 
strengthen the prestige of the U.S. 
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Kennedy-Information and Communications 
Characteristic: Kennedy did not rely solely on 
his staff for information and en-
deavored to keep as many chan-
nels of information as possible 
open to himself. 
Specific Hypothesis: The fact that Kennedy did not 
rely entirely on his staff for infor-
mation lessened the chance that 
his perception of situations re-
quiring action would be formed 
by his advisors. 1t meant that 
Kennedy, not his advisors, would 
be the final judge as to what in-
formation was important. 
Johnson-Sphere of Competence 
Characteristic: Johnson conceives of his advisory 
staff more as friends than as idea 
men and tends to personalize his 
relationships with his staff to a 
great extent. 
Specific Hypothesis: Johnson's personalization of his 
staff has led to a rather close 
supervision of his staff by him. 
This has resulted in the exodus 
of many of Kennedy's "intellec-
tuals" who disliked working un-
der conditions of close supervi-
sion. Reflecting the Johnson 
image, his staff is now made up 
largely of pragmatic individuals 
who can provide the President 
with hard facts rather than ex-
treme positions from which he 
can choose in making decisions. 
Johnson-Motivation 
Characteristic: Johnson desires to be a "great" 
President. 
Specific Hypothesis: His desire to go down in history 
as one of the great Presidents 
pervades all of his actions and 
makes him extremely conscious 
of criticism in his foreign policy 
decisions. Thus, decisions are 
made at the margin , leaving am-
ple room for maneuver should 
consensus fail to develop in sup-
port of those decisions. 
Johnson-Information and Communications 
Characteristic: Johnson believes in working 
through his advisory staff in the 
procurement of information. 
Specific Hypothesis: His reliance on his advisors to 
solicit information has created a 
situation where it is more difficult 
to gain access to the President 
than in his predecessor's admin-
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istration. This has diminished the 
amount of information which 
reaches the President from 
sources other than his advisors. 
1n the end, it may mean that the 
number of alternatives available 
to him in problem solving may 
also be diminished. 
Typologies 
Snyder suggests that there are six decision-making 
types: the communicator, the innovator, the traditional-
ist, the literalist, the power-seeker, and the career serv-
ant ( Snyder, 1962: 169). 1n attempting to cast Presi-
dents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson into one of 
these typologies, it was found that they were a bit too re-
strictive to properly typify any of the Presidents ade-
quately. Thus, a combination typology for each was de-
veloped. 
Eisenhower could be classified as the "traditionalist-
career servant" type. He was a traditionalist in that prec-
edent and long-standing habits of procedure and thought 
governed his decision-making. 1n addition, his actions 
contributed to the slowing down of organizational change 
and to rigidities of approach to problems. The career-
servant typology is applicable in that he was the type of 
decision-maker who maintained a carefully correct atti-
tude with respect to role limitations. 
Kennedy would be the "innovator - power-seeker -
communicator" type since he was a risk taker - in a 
sense a rebel against the normative order - and an origi-
nal thinker who was a catalyst as far as the intellectual 
processes of decision-making were concerned. He pressed 
towards the outer limits of the negotiable area of his 
sphere of competence and his position clearly dominated 
his behavior. Kennedy was a leader who had a definite 
skill in translating specialists to each other and in provid-
ing bases on which the different perspectives of decision-
making could be integrated. He further personified this 
typology in that he was a leader who took a broad view 
of his sphere of competence and tended to personalize 
his relationships even when it meant departing from nor-
mal channels of communication. 
Johnson is the "power-seeker - literalist" type . Like 
Kennedy, his position in the political system clearly dom-
inates his behavior. He is the type who will violate pro-
cedural norms and take public stands on policy issues if 
it serves his purpose. Like Kennedy, Johnson takes a 
broad view of his sphere of competence. He is a self-
styled "realist" who perceives only the major essentials 
of situations or problems. Johnson is the type of leader 
who wishes to deal with specifics much more than with 
abstract generalities and his decision-making activities 
are characterized by pragmatism and a search for facts. 
General Characteristics of the Eisenhower, 
Kennedy and Johnson Approaches 
Possibly the most striking aspect of the Eisenhower 
approach to foreign policy matters was his delegation of 
authority to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. 
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There seems to be little doubt that this delegation was 
virtually complete and that policy formulated by Dulles 
was rarely, if ever, reversed by Eisenhower. Indeed, 
Sherman Adams has written that such delegation, "in-
cluded the responsibility for developing the specific poli-
cy . . . the decision where the administration would 
stand, and what course of action would be followed in 
each international crisis" ( Adam, 1962: 92). This aspect 
of Eisenhower's competence was manifestly evident in 
the Hungarian and Suez decisions where careful analysis 
failed to resolve the question of who actually made the 
decisions, Eisenhower or his Secretary of State. 
All this was in sharp contrast to the Kennedy approach 
which placed the Secretary of State in a subordinate posi-
tion to the President in foreign policy matters. Where 
Eisenhower had looked to Dulles for foreign policy and 
left its formulation and execution in the Secretary's 
hands, Kennedy did not consider foreign policy to be 
policy unless and until it had gone through his hands 
and had his personal approval. In fact, under Kennedy, 
many top policies originated in the White House and then 
moved through the policy-making machinery of the State 
Department for appraisal and comment. Jt is true that 
Kennedy did endeavor to enhance the prestige of the 
State Department and the Secretary of State, however, he 
did not do this by abdicating his responsibility or author-
ity in foreign policy matters. 
Johnson's relations with his Secretary of State lies 
somewhere between the extremes presented by the Ken-
nedy and Eisenhower approaches. Johnson, who feels 
more at ease with domestic affairs, relies on his Secretary 
of State, uses him and his other advisors as sounding 
boards for his own ideas, and then, after some sort of 
consensus is reached, makes the decision himself. 
Besides the differences in relation to their Secretaries 
of State, Eisenhower and Kennedy had divergent views 
regarding the staffing of the Executive Office itself. And 
here again, Johnson treads the middle ground between 
the two. 
Eisenhower, relying on his long years of Army expe-
rience, set up a rigid staff system in the White House 
which was highly reminiscent of the armed forces sys-
tem. Eisenhower's staff system provided for fixed lines of 
authority and explicit functions for each member of the 
staff. Everyone fitted into an orderly and carefully pre-
scribed organizational system headed by Eisenhower's 
chief of staff, Sherman Adams. Only Adams reported di-
rectly to the President; everyone else had to report to the 
Chief Executive through the chain of command - much 
like the procedure in the armed forces. Adams, during 
most of the Eisenhower Administration, kept a tight grip 
on White House affairs as assistant to the President-
some have called him the "assistant President" - and 
ruled with a firm hand, shielding the President from all 
but the most urgent problems. 
Kennedy created a staffing system which was much 
less rigid than was Eisenhower's . Kennedy's personal 
tastes regarding the Presidential office made it practically 
a foregone conclusion that no chief of staff would chan-
nel information to him or, what is more important, speak 
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for him. Kennedy meant to be his own chief of staff and 
endeavored to work directly with the individuals involved 
in an issue; not through a staff of subordinates. Kennedy 
intended to keep his hands directly on the controls of 
government and a chain of command system clearly was 
incompatible with such an approach. While Kennedy did 
have trusted assistants, they did not perform the function 
that Eisenhower's assistants did in shielding him from 
matters they did not consider important. Kennedy's as-
sistants acted more in the role of intermediaries or liaison 
men who could keep him informed while carrying out 
Presidential directives. Whereas, the channels of commu-
nication to Eisenhower were jealously guarded by his as-
sistants, no such powers were given to Kennedy's staff 
men. Lines of communication were always open to Ken-
nedy and no staff filtered information before it reached 
him. His practice of leaving his door open periodically 
each day so that his staff could come in and discuss their 
ideas with him was a reflection of Kennedy's desire to 
keep the channels of information open to himself. 
Johnson's staff system, inherited from Kennedy, has 
developed along the Kennedy lines but with a marked 
Johnson style. While not embracing the rigid staff system 
of Eisenhower, Johnson nevertheless has not developed 
a flexible system like Kennedy's. Johnson's staff people 
do not fit into rigidly specific roles as with Eisenhower 
but they are more in the nature of "generalists" than 
were Kennedy's people. The exodus of the Kennedy in-
tellectuals in the months after Johnson succeeded to the 
Presidency reflects a basic difference in Johnson's, as 
compared to Kennedy's approach. 
Johnson is more interested in advice as to the best 
course of action in a particular situation than in the 
merits of that situation. Accordingly, his staff is struc-
tured along these lines. He believes, and is like Eisen-
hower in this respect, in the machinery of government 
and endeavors to work through this machinery wherever 
possible. His staff is "chain-of-commandish" to a great 
extent but not as pronounced as was Eisenhower's. 
Johnson's concept of the Presidency is reflected in the 
close supervision his staff is subjected to and, incidental-
ly, is the reason given by many of Kennedy's staff people 
for leaving the Johnson Administration. Gone too is 
Kennedy's practice of leaving his office door open for his 
advisors to come in; Johnson has replaced this with a 
system whereby his advisors must make appointments 
before seeing him. 
Another facet of the approach to the handling of the 
Presidency which distinguishes the three Presidents has 
to do with the Cabinet as an advisory body. While Eisen-
hower relied on full , formal Cabinet meetings to discuss 
important decisions, Kennedy considered Cabinet meet-
ings a waste of time and energy and preferred to confer 
only with those directly involved in a problem. Kennedy 
placed more reliance on ad hoc groups formed to con-
sider specific problems and chose men for these groups 
whom he felt would give him the most valuable advice 
and counsel on a particular problem. With Kennedy, the 
nature of the problem determined the group with which 
he would work. Full Cabinet meetings were usually 
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called only for the consideration of government-wide 
problems having to do with domestic affairs. When it 
came to foreign affairs, Kennedy preferred to confine 
Cabinet activity to briefings by the Secretary of State and 
other trusted advisors and experts from his White House 
Staff, the Defense Department, and the State Department. 
Johnson's relations with his Cabinet are very much 
like Kennedy's were. Like Kennedy, he does not call 
many formal Cabinet meetings on foreign policy matters 
and tends to rely on a small group of advisors. Johnson 
does, however, utilize full Cabinet meetings for domestic 
matters and his respect for the "governmental machin-
ery" concept evidently leads him to hold Cabinet meetings 
merely as a formality at times. There is every indication, 
however, that policy is made by Johnson's small group of 
advisors rather than by the Cabinet as such. 
The manner in which each of the Presidents perceived 
of and approached situations requiring action is also re-
vealing and deserves examination. Eisenhower seems to 
have waited in the White House for situations to develop. 
His staff shielded him as long as possible, then presented 
facts in outline. Decisions were often deferred until they 
became absolutely necessary. Kennedy, by contrast, 
reached out and gathered information, stimulated situa-
tions requiring action, and then acted with determination. 
There is every indication that Johnson's approach is 
much like Kennedy's in this respect except that there is 
more emphasis on consensus before decisions are made 
and more effort to float "trial balloons" before policy is 
announced. 
With regard to the level at which decisions were made, 
it would seem that, whereas Eisenhower preferred to 
have as many decisions as possible made at the staff 
level, Kennedy wanted to make all important decisions 
and at least know about the less important ones. The 
Johnson approach is similar to Kennedy's in this respect; 
possibly more extreme in that Johnson makes a tremen-
dous effort to control every facet of decision-making. 
Concerning the acquisition of information, research 
indicates that Eisenhower, who was never a voracious 
reader, liked to have his staff condense information into 
one page memoranda and brief him on developments. 
Johnson also prefers the written word to face-to-face 
confrontation with his advisors and wants information 
presented to him in this manner. Kennedy, on the other 
hand, liked to read everything and interpret for himself 
that which was relevant. Unlike Eisenhower and John-
son, however, Kennedy enjoyed the give and take of 
face-to-face confrontation with his advisors and encour-
aged them to present their ideas to him in this manner. 
Eisenhower differed from Kennedy and Johnson in that 
he liked to be presented with decisions already worked 
out so that he could say "yes" or "no" to the finished 
product. Kennedy wanted to be presented with many 
alternatives in rough form then choose what he felt was 
the correct one. In effect, Eisenhower had one method of 
reaching decisions: by initialing decisions his staff pre-
sented him with. Kennedy utilized at least four ap-
proaches; as does Johnson with minor variations: 1) De-
cisions might be made by the President based upon the 
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recommendation of a Cabinet officer without consulta-
tion with any members of the White House staff. Kenne-
dy used this technique more than does Johnson who is 
interested in getting the reaction of others on almost all 
decisions. 2) Decisions might be made after asking staff 
members to make recommendations and after sounding 
out these recommendations with other advisors. 3) De-
cisions might be made within the context of National Se-
curity Council meetings or Cabinet meetings after these 
bodies discussed the relative merits of the situation. 
While Kennedy relied less on the National Security Coun-
cil than did Eisenhower in this regard, it would seem that 
Johnson de-emphasizes the role of the Council even 
more. 4) Policies might simply be delineated within the 
framework of which Cabinet officers and other top offi-
cials could make their own decisions. Kennedy relied on 
this device much more so than does Johnson. Kennedy 
used at various times, and Johnson still uses, any or a 
combination of these methods. 
General Conclusions Applicable to 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
A study of decision-making at the top-level enables 
the observer to draw certain general conclusions which, 
while they are drawn from specific cases, form the basis 
for generalization regarding foreign policy making in 
general. Several of these observations are listed below by 
way of illustration: 
Conclusion 1: Sweeping delegation of authority by a 
President to his Secretary of State leads to the concentra-
tion of foreign policy decision-making in the hands of the 
Secretary of State; thereby debilitating Presidential ini-
tiative in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. 
Conclusion 2: A "traditionalist" President who views his 
powers and prerogatives narrowly tends to define courses 
of action open to him in the same restrictive terms. Such 
an attitude on the part of a President necessarily limits 
the range of alternatives available to him in the solving 
of foreign policy problems. 
Conclusion 3: "Narrow gauge" foreign policy objectives, 
e.g., "peace with justice," tend to limit the possible re-
sponses to crisis situations. 
Conclusion 4: Too great a reliance on staff and their de-
termination as to the relevancy of information may cut a 
President off from important information; thus limiting 
the President's perception of situations requiring action. 
Such limitations on perception in turn leads to solutions 
to problems which might not always be in the national 
interest. 
Conclusion 5: A staff system which is so structured as 
to provide for rigidly specific roles and the assignment of 
explicit dvties cuts down on cross-currents of opinion 
and leads to a diminution of alternatives for the solution 
of problems. 
Conclusion 6 : An accessibk President, i.e., one who 
keeps all channels of information open to himself, is in a 
much better position to make decisions based on rele-
vant information. 
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Conclusion 7: A President who requires his subordinates 
to submit important decisions to him before they are 
finalized and before they are executed can keep a tighter 
grip on foreign policy matters than one who allows staff 
members to make decisions on their own authority. 
Conclusion 8: Positive response decisions are more apt 
to be made by an "independent" President who takes a 
broad view of his powers. Such an interpretation of 
power increases the range of alternatives, thus enhancing 
positivism. 
Conclusion 9: Decisions which are based on limited or 
incomplete information are more likely to be decisions 
which include a passive response to crisis situations. This 
is true because a decision-maker, possessing inadequate 
information, tends to choose alternative courses of ac-
tion which leave the most margin for error and which 
offer the least danger. 
Conclusion l O: A fluid and flexible staffing system in 
which fixed routines and assignments are kept to a mini-
mum, stimulates the type of productive tension which re-
sults in carefully worked-out decisions. Such a staffing 
system, due to the overlapping of roles and assignments, 
broadens the range of alternatives used in problem solv-
ing and keeps uniformity of advice to a minimum. 
Methodological Conclusions 
The analytical device utilized in this study is an ex-
tremely valuable research tool for two primary reasons. 
First, because it specifies the relevant factors which need 
to be investigated, it insures that pertinent components 
which may have contributed to the decision under study 
will not be overlooked or disregarded by the analyst. The 
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systematic classification technique embodied in the frame 
of reference provides for the categorization of all the 
variables which may have had a bearing on the decision 
and thus provides the researcher with a conceptual 
framework within which he may study each of these 
variables individually; thereby constructing an empirical 
explanation for the decision. Secondly, because the frame 
of reference sets the limits and establishes the boundaries 
of investigation, it provides for parsimony in the collec-
tion of data. By limiting the researcher only to those vari-
ables which are most likely to have a direct bearing on 
the subject under analysis, the scheme keeps unnecessary 
research to a minimum and insures that irrelevant ma-
terial will not be included in the analysis. 
In conclusion, then, it can be said that the decision-
making approach outlined here is a useful device which 
provides a much needed frame of reference for relating 
the many aspects of state action. The scheme, presenting 
as it does a common frame of reference which specifies 
what data ought to be collected and how these data can 
be most fruitfully ordered, does away with the random 
search for information which so often characterizes for-
eign policy-making studies. Thus, the decision-making 
approach introduces a measure of order in a field which 
is badly in need of such direction. In this respect it con-
stitutes a major contribution to the discipline. 
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